Jim Bowden Is Every General Manager

Obligatory Bowden-on-a-Nats-Segway photo!
AP Photos / The Washington Times, Peter Lockley

By Bill

I've done my fair share of ripping GM-turned-internet-and-radio-baseball-expert Jim Bowden, particularly on Twitter. More in the last few weeks than previously, I'd say, but I did quite a bit of it before that, too. He makes it pretty easy.

Near the beginning of the offseason, Bowden wrote a piece that seemed like one of the most ridiculous things he'd ever come up with, called "Pricing the free agents" (Insider only). In it, Bowden listed what he saw as the top 50 free agents, and attempted to predict the contract they would receive, or, in his words, an "estimate of what I would pay the top 50 free agents if I were a GM of a club that had the budget and need for that kind of player."

Very nearly every prediction seemed absurdly high to me, and to many others. I admit, I mocked it quite a bit (I can't take the time to scroll back and find examples because it was too long ago, but they're there if you want to look). Four years for Madson? $30 million for Cuddyer? Please.

But as the chips started to fall and players signed, it became clear that he was probably not as far off as many of us assumed. As we went further along, it became clear that he wasn't off at all. The bloom might be coming off the rose a bit as some holdovers end up going at bargain prices, but still, almost all of Bowden's picks have been close enough to be considered right on.

Here's a chart of the top 25 players on Bowden's list who have signed big-league free agent contracts (some have accepted arbitration, like David Ortiz, and a couple haven't signed yet, like Roy Oswalt). The first two columns are Bowden's predictions for contract length and average annual value (AAV), the next two are the actual length and AAV at which the player signed, and the final two are the amount by which Bowden missed (in either direction) on those two numbers:

Ignoring the Island

The news is semi-official, Nationals' special assistant to the GM Jose Rijo is out and the team's Dominican program is going to be entirely revamped in light of the Esmailyn Gonzalez/Carlos Daniel Alvarez Lugo scandal that cost the Nats $1.4 million. Certainly this is the end of the road for Rijo, and perhaps (hopefully?) for Jim Bowden as well.

But buried deep within this ESPN article is this other little nugget: "The Milwaukee Brewers are the only organization without a Dominican academy."

What does this mean, both in philosophical and practical terms for the Brew Crew? First, it means that they are less likely to be embroiled in scandals like the Nats, and other teams, have. By refusing to pay out large bonuses to players with questionable backgrounds (not that they are questionable people, just that their identities invariably have to be suspected and vetted). It minimizes their risk, which is terribly important for a team in the smallest media market in the country. Frankly, the Brewers can't afford to throw away $1.4 million.

It also means that they are able to focus their attention heavily elsewhere. A quick perusal of their minor league system shows a heavy Venezuelan influence (including top prospect Alcides Escobar), suggesting that they are dedicated to mining Latin America for talent, just not the D.R.


But practically, their decision seems to leave their cupboard almost entirely bare of good young Dominican players. Of their top 10 prospects (as rated by Baseball America), only Angel Solome is from the Dominican, but he went to high school in the U.S. and was drafted in the 5th round. Carlos Villanueva's the only other Dominican on the 40 man roster, and he was originally signed by the Giants and acquired via trade. John Sickels rates Wily Peralta as the team's #12 prospect, and describes him as "A high upside arm, but a long way from the majors."

At this point, before minor league rosters are set, it's hard to determine with any accuracy just how out of step the Brewers' system is with the rest of the league. What is the proportion of Dominican players in the Brewers' organization vs. the rest of the league, and what is the proportion of Latin players? And it will be interesting to see just what kind of effect this organizational strategy has on their major league club going forward. The Brewers seem to have survived by drafting well (Fielder, Hardy, Hart, Braun, Gallardo, Hall, Sheets, and Parra were all draft choices), but as their success has led to lower picks, it will be interesting to see if that run of success can continue without additional support from Latin America (thusfar, only two of the players on their 40 man roster were signed as amateur free agents).

The Common Man isn't quick to condemn the Brew Crew for their novel approach. Given that other teams undoubtedly have more money to dole out to the elite prospects (like Esmailyn Gonzalez, eh?), choosing not to compete there and to corner markets elsewhere seems like a sound strategy. And as more teams expand further into Venezuela (or Hugo Chavez makes it prohibitively difficult to operate there), it will be fun to see where the next great frontier is that they can exploit? What say you? Where should the Brewers go next?